Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

1-1-2011

Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Governors
Pawlenty and Carcieri
Tim Pawlenty
Office of the Governor of the State of Minnesota

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
Pawlenty, Tim, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Governors Pawlenty and Carcieri" (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation. Paper 195.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/195

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV -EMT Document 132

Filed 11/19/10 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION

STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through
BILL McCOLLUM, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
)
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

Case No.: 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT

BRIEF OF GOVERNORS TIM PAWLENTY AND DONALD L. CARCIERI
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hans F. Bader (D.C. Bar # 466545)
Counsel of Record
Sam Kazman
Competitive Enterprise Institute
1899 L Street, NW, 12 th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 331-2278
Facsimile: (202) 331-0640
Counsel for Amici Curiae Governors
Tim Pawlenty and Donald L. Carcieri

Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV -EMT Document 132

Filed 11/19/10 Page 2 of 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTEREST OF AMICI ...................................................................................1

II. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................2
The Affordable Care Act is Unconstitutionally Vague and Indefinite ..............2
A. The ACA’s Ambiguity Renders It Illegitimate Under Spending-Clause
Jurisprudence, Which Requires That Federal Conditions Be Clear and
Definite Enough to Be Contractually Valid and Enforceable .......................... 2
B. The ACA’s Complexity Accentuates Its Vagueness .......................................... 4
C. The ACA’s Vagueness Is Aggravated by the Vast Discretion and Virtual
Blank Check It Gives to the Federal Officials Who Implement It ...............6
D. The Law’s Expansive Reach Makes Its Nebulousness More Grave ............. 10
E. By Leaving the Federal Government With Unbridled Power to Expand
States’ Medicaid Obligations, the ACA Violates Principles Forbidding
Illusory and Indeterminate Contracts.................................................................. 13

i

Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV -EMT Document 132

Filed 11/19/10 Page 3 of 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) .............................. 3, 4, 6
Association Ben. Services, Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2007) ..................... 3
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) .................................................................................. 3, 4
Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. 2004) .................................................................................. 10
Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991) ............................................................................................. 6
Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) .......................................................... 4
Matter of T & B General Contracting, 833 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1987) ........................................ 3
Nebraska v. E.P.A., 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...................................................................... 4
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) .......................................................................... 2
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) ........................................ 3, 14
Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 13
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) .......................................................................................... 12
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) ......................................................................... 1, 3, 6
Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................... 12
Young & Vann Supply Co. v. Gulf F. & A. Ry. Co., 5 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.1925)............................ 13

Constitutional Provisions
Minn. Const., Art. IV, § 23.......................................................................................................... 1
Minn. Const., Art. XIII, § 1 ......................................................................................................... 1
Rhode Island Const., Art. IX, § 15............................................................................................... 1
Rhode Island Const., Art. XII ...................................................................................................... 1
Spending Clause................................................................................................................ 1, 3, 15
Tenth Amendment....................................................................................................................... 2

Treatises
Restatement (Second) Contracts ............................................................................................ 3, 14
Williston on Contracts (4th ed. Updated 2010) .......................................................................... 14

Other Authorities
Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, New York Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B2 ............. 7
Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health Coverage, New York Times, Oct. 7, 2010, at
B1 ........................................................................................................................................... 8
Chen, How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets, Heritage Foundation, Nov. 10,
2010 (Backgrounder #2489) .................................................................................................. 12
Congressional Research Service, Deadlines for the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Oct. 1, 2010, at 1 ........................................... 8
Congressional Research Service, Summary of Potential Employer Penalties Under PPACA (P.L.
111-148), Apr. 5, 2010 .......................................................................................................... 11
ii

Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV -EMT Document 132

Filed 11/19/10 Page 4 of 20

Department of Health and Human Services, Approved Applications for Waiver of the Annual
Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 As of Nov. 1, 2010 ...................................... 7
Freire, Dems Admit CEO’s Were Right to Report Losses from Obamacare, Washington
Examiner, April 27, 2010 ........................................................................................................ 8
Georgetown Health Policy Institute Center for Children and Families, Medicaid and State
Budgets: Looking at the Facts (2008) .................................................................................... 12
Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at A25....................................... 14
Haislmaier & Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, Heritage Foundation, July 1, 2010
(Backgrounder #2433)..................................................................................................... 10, 11
Joint Economic Committee Republicans, America’s New Health Care System Revealed: Updated
Chart Shows Obamacare's Bewildering Complexity, Committee News, Aug. 2, 2010 .............. 4
Joint Economic Committee, Republican Staff, Your New Health Care System, ............................ 4
Malkin, Creators Syndicate, Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver, Washington Examiner,
Nov. 18, 2010, at 43 ............................................................................................................ 7, 8
Sen. Tom Coburn, HHS Administrative Failure: HHS Failed to Meet a Third of Mandated
Deadlines Under New Federal Health Care Law, Oct. 4, 2010 ................................................ 9
Senator Tom Harkin, Health Legislation A Solid Foundation to Build Upon, Wilmington NewsJournal, Dec. 30, 2009 ........................................................................................................... 13
Siegel, Obamacare Will Clog America’s Medical System, USA Today, Oct. 19, 2010, at 9A ....... 8
Surber, Obamacare Leads to 47% Premium Hike, Charleston Daily Mail, Oct. 16, 2010 ............. 8

iii

Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV -EMT Document 132

Filed 11/19/10 Page 5 of 20

I.
INTEREST OF AMICI
As the Governors of Minnesota and Rhode Island, respectively, amici Tim
Pawlenty and Donald L. Carcieri have a direct interest in this case. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) fundamentally transforms
Medicaid and will effectively co-opt control over the States’ budgetary processes
and legislative agendas, crowding out spending on other state priorities, including
duties that are mandated by state constitutions. 1 Given their role in shaping and
overseeing state budgets, the Governors have a vital stake in ensuring that basic
limits on the federal government’s spending power are maintained. 2 One of those
limits is that any conditions imposed by federal law must be clear, so that States
may exercise their choice to accept or reject federal funds “knowingly, cognizant
of the consequences of their participation.” 3 On November 12, this Court granted
the Governors leave to file their amicus brief (Docket # 108).

1

See, e.g., Minn. Const., Art. XIII, § 1 (state has “duty” to “establish a general and
uniform system of public schools” that is “thorough and efficient”); Rhode Island Const.,
Art. XII (state has “duty” to “promote public schools and public libraries” to foster
“diffusion of knowledge,” and to not “divert” education funds).
2
See, e.g., Rhode Island Const., Art. IX, § 15 (Governor “shall prepare and present” the
state budget “to the general assembly”); Minn. Const., Art. IV, § 23 (line-item veto).
3
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).

1
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II.
ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act is Unconstitutionally Vague and Indefinite
A. The ACA’s Ambiguity Renders It Illegitimate Under Spending-Clause
Jurisprudence, Which Requires That Federal Conditions Be Clear and
Definite Enough to Be Contractually Valid and Enforceable
As plaintiffs rightly note, the ACA “violates the principle that conditions on
federal funds must be unambiguous, so as to ‘enable the states to exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’” 4 This is
both because the ACA includes “vast potential liabilities that cannot even be
projected as of now,” and because “the ACA’s sweeping changes could not
reasonably have been foreseen by the states when they started their Medicaid
programs.” 5 As a result, the States could not have voluntarily and knowingly
assumed the burdens and liabilities now imposed on them by the ACA.
Even looking at the ACA purely from the vantage point of the present,
rather than when States began participating in Medicaid, the ACA is so ambiguous
and indefinite that it is facially unconstitutional, as we explain below. This
vagueness undermines political accountability and thus aggravates the ACA’s
unduly coercive aspects, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 6

4

Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 36.
Id.. at 42, 45.
6
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (Spending Clause legislation’s
legitimacy is rooted in the fact that “where Congress encourages state regulation rather
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”; “Accountability is thus
5

2
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized legislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power as “much in the nature of a contract: in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” 7
“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
contract.” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
But even if States could choose to stop participating in the Medicaid
program, the ACA is so vague that it does not – and cannot – allow the States “to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst). The ACA fails to
speak “unambiguously,” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, about how a State can opt out
of Medicaid’s expansion, and what State compliance may mean if it opts in.
Because the States are not given a clear and informed choice between
participation and non-participation, the Act lacks the hallmarks of contractual
enforceability. See, e.g., Matter of T & B General Contracting, 833 F.2d 1455,
1459 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Without a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, no
enforceable contract arises.”). 8 The Act is indefinite in other key respects as well,
so “we cannot fairly say that [a] State could make an informed choice.” Pennhurst,
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in
accordance with the views of the local electorate.”).
7
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186
(2002); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
8
See also Association Ben. Services, Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 850 (7th
Cir. 2007); Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 33; see Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (must
show states’ acceptance of “the terms of the contract’”).
3
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451 U.S. at 25. “There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is
unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.” 9
B. The ACA’s Complexity Accentuates Its Vagueness
The ACA is so mammoth, its provisions are so complex, and its passage
was so irregular that the federal attorneys who have spent the past eight months
defending it cannot even clearly identify its length. (See Tr. at 8, Docket # 77).
Its sheer complexity is aptly, but only partially, captured by the chart provided by
minority staff of the Joint Economic Committee, which is found on the next
page. 10 (While that “chart displays a bewildering array of new government
agencies, regulations and mandates,” the reality is even more complicated, since
“committee analysts could not fit the entire health care bill on one chart. ‘This
portrays only about one-third of the complexity of the final bill. It’s actually worse
than this.’” 11

9

Id. at 17-18; see Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 296; Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186.
See Joint Economic Committee, Republican Staff, Your New Health Care System,
available at http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=5ee16e0f6ee6-4643-980e-b4d5f1d7759a (visited Nov. 18, 2010); Nebraska v. E.P.A., 331 F.3d
995, 998 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (taking judicial notice of agency materials on web); Air
Transport Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 613 F.3d 206, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing JEC
report); Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (report by JEC staff).
11
See Joint Economic Committee Republicans, America’s New Health Care System
Revealed: Updated Chart Shows Obamacare's Bewildering Complexity, Committee
News, Aug. 2, 2010 (quoting Rep. Brady), available at
http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeNews&ContentRecord_i
d=bb302d88-3d0d-4424-8e33-3c5d2578c2b0 (visited Nov. 18, 2010).
10
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This enormous complexity accentuates its vagueness, 12 and makes it all but
impossible to comprehend “from the perspective of a state official who is engaged
in the process of deciding whether the State should accept [federal] funds and the
obligations that go with those funds.” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 291.
Thus, the Plaintiff States cannot be expected to “exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
C. The ACA’s Vagueness Is Aggravated by the Vast Discretion and
Virtual Blank Check It Gives to the Federal Officials Who Implement It
Even if the ACA’s text were fully understood, many of its requirements would
ultimately be unknowable due to the unprecedented discretion granted to federal
officials to implement key provisions. States, for example, will be required to
“develop service systems” to provide long-term care that “allocate resources for
services in a manner that is responsible to the changing needs and choices of
beneficiaries . . . .” ACA § 2404(a). The substance of this vague mandate is
delegated to the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id.
Similarly, states must provide individuals who are “newly eligible” for
Medicaid with “benchmark” coverage. ACA § 2001(a)(2)(A). The substance of
this mandate too is expressly delegated to the discretion of the Secretary. ACA §§
2001(c)(3), 1302(a), (b). The Secretary is also empowered to determine, inter
alia, state enrollment programs for Medicaid and CHIP, ACA § 1413(a), obstetric
12

Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991)(“complexity” of statutes can make “it
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend” their requirements); Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1999), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000)
(“complex” provisions can result in “unfair surprise”).
6
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and smoking cessation services that must be provided by the states, ACA §§ 2301,
4107, and myriad data collection, evaluation, and reporting requirements that must
be carried out by the states, see, e.g., ACA §§ 2001(d)(1)(C), 2701, 2951.
The Secretary’s vast discretion in implementing the ACA is illustrated by
the more than 111 waivers that she has granted to employers whose health care
plans were unable to satisfy the ACA’s costly mandates. 13 1.2 million employees
participate in the health plans that have already received waivers, and far more
may be affected in the future. 14 These waivers are not permanent, but last for only
one year, adding further uncertainty. 15 Moreover, there is no telling whether these
ad hoc waivers, some of which were granted to politically-influential unions or
businesses that supported the Administration and the ACA’s passage, 16 will
granted in the future to anyone else. 17 If not, States may face enormous additional

13

E.g., Reed Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, New York Times, Nov. 10,
2010, at B2 (available at www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/health/policy/10waiver.html);
Department of Health and Human Services, Approved Applications for Waiver of the
Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 As of Nov. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html.
14
Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B2.
15
Department of Health and Human Services, Approved Applications for Waiver of the
Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 As of Nov. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html; see
Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B2.
16
See Michelle Malkin, Creators Syndicate, Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver,
Washington Examiner, Nov. 18, 2010, at 43 (www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/
columns/Repeal-is-the-ultimate-Obamacare-waiver-1595832-108685514.html).
17
See Michelle Malkin, Waiver-Mania! The Ever-Expanding Obamacare Escapee List,
Nov. 14, 2010, at 10:26 a.m. (http://michellemalkin.com/2010/11/14/waiver-mania-theever-expanding-obamacare-escapee-list/) (arguing that Obama Administration is granting
these “temporary” waivers not out of “compassion” or for consistent policy reasons, “but
out of a panicked urgency to avoid a public relations disaster” of employers dumping
large numbers of employees from health insurance shortly after passage of a law that the
7
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costs, both from people who lose their employer-provided health insurance 18 and
end up on state-subsidized Medicaid programs, and, to a lesser extent, from the
burdens it imposes on state employers (such as increased premium costs, 19 and
assessments imposed on employers for failure to offer the level of insurance
mandated under ACA rules.) The Secretary’s vast discretion in writing and
waiving ACA rules makes predicting these costs simply impossible, and makes it
impossible for States to ascertain “the consequences of their participation,” Dole,
483 U.S. at 207. (Many rules that HHS is supposed to issue to implement the
ACA’s vague requirements have not been issued yet, and either have no statutory
deadline at all, 20 or have deadlines that have been flouted. 21).

President promised would allow employees to keep their healthcare plan if they liked it);
Reed Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health Coverage, New York Times,
Oct. 7, 2010, at B1 (Obama Administration “tried to defuse stiffening resistance” to ACA
through waivers, “as part of a broader strategic effort” to mollify critics “at a time when
the midterm elections are looming”; White House official “acknowledged that the
concessions given to companies and insurers reflected attempts to avoid having people
lose their current coverage before the full law goes into effect”; “politics from state to
state” cited as factor in debate over how stringently to enforce ACA mandates)
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/business/07insure.html)
18
In the absence of waivers, many employers will drop their health care plans. See, e.g.,
Michelle Malkin, Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver, Washington Examiner,
Nov. 18, 2010, at 43 (Fowler Packing Company “pursued an HHS waiver because their
low-wage agricultural workers would have lost the[ir] basic coverage” absent a waiver,
stripping “large numbers of workers” of “access to affordable coverage.’”)
19
See Dr. Marc Siegel, Obamacare Will Clog America’s Medical System, USA Today,
Oct. 19, 2010, at 9A (ACA pointlessly drives “up costs and premiums”) (available at
www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-10-19-column19_ST_N.htm); J. P. Freire,
Dems Admit CEOs Were Right to Report Losses from Obamacare, Wash. Examiner,
April 27, 2010, at 1:24 p.m. (www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltwayconfidential/dems-admit-ceos-were-right-to-report-losses-from-obamacare92199744.html); cf. Don Surber, Obamacare Leads to 47% Premium Hike, Charleston
Daily Mail, Oct. 16, 2010, 9 a.m. (http://blogs.dailymail.com/donsurber/archives/22999).
20
See Congressional Research Service, Deadlines for the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Oct. 1, 2010, at 1 (ACA rules
8
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It also remains unclear whether many state employers will be able to
benefit from the Act’s “grandfather clause” provision protecting existing health
plans from some of the ACA’s costly mandates, as even the government’s own
estimates suggest. 22 HHS has adopted regulations construing that provision so
narrowly so that it arguably does not apply to the majority of employers. George
Pantos, Manage Rising Health Care Costs, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Sept. 20,
2010, at A21 (“The Obama administration has released its rules governing
‘grandfathered’ insurance plans. Those that qualify will remain legal . . .Those that
don't will have to comply with costly new mandates. Throughout his campaign
for health reform, the president vowed that he wouldn't disrupt Americans'
existing policies. These rules are . . . .so onerous, though, that most employers will
find it impossible to follow them.”) (found in Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 19387643).
As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Given the complexity of the
health care system prior to PPACA, and the many changes generated by the new
law, the impact on states will vary and will be difficult to estimate, even with the

“generally” have “flexible deadlines or no deadline at all”) (available at
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=54103bf6-ae3a-47be916e-72548ba34b5b).
21
See id. at 3-5 (“no public information found” for many rules that were due to be issued
by now); Sen. Tom Coburn, HHS Administrative Failure: HHS Failed to Meet a Third of
Mandated Deadlines Under New Federal Health Care Law, Oct. 4, 2010, available at
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/rightnow?ContentRecord_id=f6efe11e-39bc4532-a586-d1ad0b608e80.
22
See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34552 (June 17, 2010) (employers
relinquishing grandfather status estimated at between 33% to 69% for all employers, with
large employers ranging between 29% and 64%).
9
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best modeling.” 23 Moreover, the ACA’s Medicaid costs will vary widely among
States:
“State impacts will vary based on current coverage levels across states,
generosity of the state’s Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules and other statefinanced coverage programs, existing private insurance regulatory
authority, standards, and resources, current state fiscal health, and other
factors. Such variation creates difficulties in accurately estimating costs
across states. There are substantial differences among states in terms of the
percentages of the states’ populations that would meet the definition of
“newly eligible” under the mandatory Medicaid expansion as compared to
previously eligible individuals. Federal matching rates to share in the cost
of Medicaid/CHIP coverage for these individuals under health reform will
vary by state, by year, and by eligibility status.” 24
Moreover, “Beyond the extra Medicaid costs that states are certain to incur, there
are some other state Medicaid cost increases that are probable, but not definite,”
such as “payments to so-called Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) and
payments to specialist physicians.” 25

D. The Law’s Expansive Reach Makes Its Nebulousness More Grave
These uncertainties and variations matter enormously because of the
massive scope of the ACA’s expansion of state Medicaid obligations and the
ACA’s vast delegation of policymaking to federal officials. 26 “Obamacare’s

23

Congressional Research Service, Memorandum re: Variation in Analyses of PPACA’s
Fiscal Impact on States, Sept. 8, 2010, at 1 (Pl. App. Ex. 36).
24
Id. at 7.
25
Edmund Haislmaier & Brian Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, Heritage
Foundation, July 1, 2010 (Backgrounder #2433), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Obamacare-Impact-on-States.
26
See Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ga. 2004) (“broad language” of statute made
its imprecise contours “too vague” to be constitutional, even though those words had a
“dictionary definition,” especially since their broad reach had the effect of delegating
“basic policy matters” to government officials on “an ad hoc” basis).
10
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unfunded mandates are a fiscal time bomb set to explode state balance sheets
across the country starting in 2014,” creating a fiscal “crisis,” notes the Heritage
Foundation. 27 The ACA will force States to “massively expand their already
burdensome Medicaid rolls” to include “all non-elderly individuals with family
incomes below 138 percent of the federal poverty line.” 28 “But that is just the
benefit costs. Obamacare does not pay for any of the costs necessary to administer
the expansion of the Medicaid rolls, rolls that are expected to increase by
approximately 50 percent in states like Nevada, Oregon, and Texas”; indeed, “just
the administrative costs of the Obamacare Medicaid expansion will cost almost
$12 billion by 2020.” 29 While the ACA’s precise costs are unknown, preliminary
estimates suggest staggering increases. In Texas alone, “the Medicaid expansion
may add more than 2 million people to the program and cost the state up to $27
billion in a decade,” while Florida faces “an additional $5.2 billion in spending
between 2013 and 2019 and more than $1 billion a year beginning in 2017,” and
California faces billions in “annual costs”; “The seven-year cost of the Medicaid
expansion in Indiana is estimated to be between $2.59 billion and $3.11 billion,
with 388,000 to 522,000 people joining the state’s Medicaid rolls,” while
27

Heritage Foundation, Morning Bell: The Obamacare Burden To Your State Budget,
November 12th, 2010 at 9:22am (http://blog.heritage.org/2010/11/12/morning-bell-theobamacare-burden-to-your-state-budget/).
28
Id. The 138 percent figure reflects “the 133 percent FPL [federal poverty level] plus
extra 5% FPL that is to be disregarded from individuals’ income when determining
Medicaid eligibility.” See Congressional Research Service, Summary of Potential
Employer Penalties Under PPACA (P.L. 111-148), Apr. 5, 2010, at pg. 2 (available at
http://www.ltgov.ri.gov/smallbusiness/employerprovisions.pdf).
29
Heritage Foundation, The Obamacare Burden To Your State Budget, supra note 27,
citing Haislmaier & Blase, supra note 25.
11
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“Obamacare will result in nearly one of five Nebraskans being covered by
Medicaid. 30 (While increasing the States’ costs, the ACA apparently reduces
some of their revenues, such as pharmacy rebate revenue. 31)
The indefinite nature of the States’ long-run financial commitments to
Medicaid make the ACA on its face contractually infirm and hence
unconstitutional. It also undermines political accountability and aggravates the
coerciveness and unduly burdensome nature of the Act. 32
Although the Act indicates that the federal government will initially pay for
some Medicaid expansions, the States are advised that they will pay for 10 percent
of some unspecified costs in four years, and there is no indication that the States
will not pay more in succeeding periods. In the initial, spare introduction of
Medicaid in 1965, there was no hint that the States 45 years later would be coerced
to spend a substantial proportion of their budgets on Medicaid under the ACA. 33

30

Lanhee Chen, How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets, Heritage
Foundation, Nov. 10, 2010 (Backgrounder #2489) (available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/How-Obamacare-Burdens-AlreadyStrained-State-Budgets), citing estimates by the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration and the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, and a study by the
Milliman econometrics experts hired by Nebraska and Indiana).
31
See Milliman Explains Assumptions and Methodology Used in Nebraska Medicaid
Budget Exposure Analysis, Daily Pak Banker, Sept. 19, 2010 (2010 WLNR 18614676).
32
Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 1997) (spending-clause legislation must
speak “affirmatively and unambiguously, so that its design is known and the States may
marshal their political will in opposition” to expropriations of sovereign rights); cf. Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (“vagueness” relevant to “overbreadth inquiry”).
33
On average states spend 16.8 percent of their general-fund budgets on Medicaid, with
Rhode Island spending 23.5 percent and Minnesota 16.8 percent. See Georgetown Health
Policy Institute Center for Children and Families, Medicaid and State Budgets: Looking
at the Facts (2008), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystemaction?file=ccf%20publications/about%20medicaid/nasbo%20final%205-1-08.pdf (last
12
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States also face great uncertainty as to the Medicaid cost-share ratio for a large
new population of single adults without children that the ACA adds to Medicaid. 34
E. By Leaving the Federal Government With Unbridled Power to Expand
States’ Medicaid Obligations, the ACA Violates Principles Forbidding
Illusory and Indeterminate Contracts
Even if there were some guarantee of a limitation on State obligations
under the ACA’s expansions of Medicaid, such a promise would be functionally
meaningless. As the Defendants admit, any such promise could be changed at the
Defendants’ whims, without any limitations or any consent by the States. See
Defs. Mem. Dis. at 16 (arguing that Congress has “full and complete power” under
42 U.S.C. § 1304 to make any alteration or amendments); id. at 15 n.7 (“Here,
Congress changed a core element of Medicaid”). 35 Indeed, backers of the Act
have called it a mere “starter home” to be expanded and fleshed out through future
legislation and administrative action, 36 which will make Medicare a “model of
simplicity compared with the current law.” 37

visited Nov. 10, 2010). Plaintiff States overall spend similar percentages. Id. Those
percentages will rise under the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid.
34
It is not clear whether the ratios will be drawn from the ACA itself, or other legislation,
like the enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentages under the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-152
35
See Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A court can appropriately
treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of fact”), citing Young & Vann
Supply Co. v. Gulf F. & A. Ry. Co., 5 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.1925).
36
Senator Tom Harkin, Health Legislation A Solid Foundation to Build Upon,
Wilmington News-Journal, Dec. 30, 2009 (calling passage of the ACA “the opening act
in health reform, not the final act. . .I think of the current health reform bill as something
of a ‘starter home’” that “has plenty of room for additions and improvements”)(available
in Westlaw news database at 2009 WLNR 26128708); Harkin Statement on the Social
Security and Medicare Board of Trustees Annual Report to Congress, Aug. 6, 2010 (2010
WLNR 156788171) (again calling ACA “starter home”); Health Care: Just A Start,
13
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It cannot be the case that the federal government has unbridled authority to
make any amendments to Medicaid, no matter how coercive or arbitrary, or how
fundamentally they change the contractual bargain between the federal
government and the States. See 1 Williston on Contracts § 4:21 (4th ed., updated
May 2010) (“a reservation in either party of a future unbridled right to determine
the nature of the performance” renders contract “too indefinite for enforcement”).
In contract law, such unbridled power vested in one party makes the
contract illusory and non-enforceable. See Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 2
cmt. e (“Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely
optional with the ‘promisor’ whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct
in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise.”); § 77 cmt. a
(“Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with
the ‘promisor’ do not constitute a promise.”). For this reason too, as well as for
obvious reasons of duress and contractual adhesion, the ACA does not qualify as a
contractually enforceable deal with the States, and violates Pennhurst’s now-well-

Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 5, 2010 (Harkin called ACA “starter home” with “great
foundation” with “room for expansions and additions”) (2010 WLNR 197651); Jacob
Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at A25 (“Sen. Tom Harkin
put the point well when he described the health bill as a “starter home.” What Harkin
neglected to mention is that the home isn't built yet”) (2010 WLNR 17483695).
37
Jacob Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at A25 (backer of
ACA observes that “Medicare was a model of simplicity compared with the current law”;
ACA “eschewed the simple approach to expanding coverage embodied in Medicare”).
14
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accepted contractual conceptualization of Spending Clause conditions.
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